Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 63 2020
Bureaucrats as managers and their roles in corporate diversification
Abstract
We examine the diversification choices and financial performance of companies run by former bureaucrats in China. We find that the ex-bureaucrat led companies are involved in more diversified business lines than other firms managed by professionals without such government backgrounds. While former bureaucrats that manage state-owned enterprises (SOEs) tend to operate in unattractive industries, those who manage private firms do businesses in more profitable, faster-growing, and more related industries. The diversification of private firms is helped by additional borrowing capacity brought in by ex-bureaucrat CEOs, while no such financing effect is found in SOEs. The overall diversification performance associated with bureaucrat CEOs is positive in private firms, but not in SOEs. As manifested by the different diversification strategies and outcomes between private firms and SOEs, the government-linked CEOs facilitate transfers of critical business resources that benefit either owners' or governments' goals.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.03.006
- Volume
- 63
- Pages
- 101171
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref