← Search

Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 18 No. 3 2012

Corporate investment, government control, and financing channels: Evidence from China's Listed Companies

Michael Firth1; Paul H. Malatesta2; Qingquan Xin3; Liping Xu4

1 Department of Finance and Insurance, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, New Territories, Hong Kong · 2 University of Washington · 3 Chongqing University · 4 Sun Yat‐Sen University

Abstract

We investigate the relation between the internally generated cash flows and fixed asset investments of Chinese firms and find that it is U-shaped. Cash flow and investment are negatively related for low levels of cash flow but positively related for high levels of cash flow. We find that government controlled listed firms have greater investment–cash flow sensitivities than do privately controlled listed companies, especially on the left-hand side of the U-shaped curve where cash flow is negative. However, the difference in sensitivities appears only among firms that possess few profitable investment opportunities. We attribute this finding to the government having multiple socio-economic objectives, which leads to increased capital expenditures by the firms it controls when internal funds are abundant and when internal funds are negative. There is no evidence that access to finance and soft budget constraints explain the differences between the investment–cash flow sensitivities of government controlled and privately controlled listed firms.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.004
Volume
18
Issue
3
Pages
433-450
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite