Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 29 2014
The dark side of CEO ability: CEO general managerial skills and cost of equity capital
Abstract
CEOs with substantial general managerial ability (generalist CEOs) possess a substantial share of organization (human) capital and have different risk-taking incentives than do their counterpart specialist CEOs. Using an index increasing in CEO general managerial skills as a proxy for general managerial ability, we find that investors require higher returns from firms featuring CEOs who have profuse general managerial ability. Furthermore, expected returns are significantly increasing with CEO general managerial ability in firms with high organization capital, that belong to M&A-intensive industries and that have complex operations, high agency problems and high anti-takeover provisions. These findings are consistent with arguments that organization (human) capital has significant expected return implications and that CEOs with higher general managerial skills may lead to higher agency problems, feature different risk-taking incentives and be more costly to retain in times of need.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.003
- Volume
- 29
- Pages
- 390-409
- Language
- en
- Sources
- crossref openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib