Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 45 2017
Corporate fraud and external social connectedness of independent directors
Abstract
We examine the effects of independent directors' external social connectedness on corporate fraud commission and detection. The results show that well-connected independent directors do not affect the likelihood of fraud commission but significantly reduce the likelihood of fraud detection given occurrence of a fraud. In particular, with a one-standard-deviation increase in independent directors' connectedness, the likelihood of fraud detection reduces by 22.5%. We also find that the consequences of fraud commission faced by firms with well-connected independent directors are less severe as fraud remains undetected for a longer period of time and fewer people are charged with fraud when independent directors are well connected. We further show that independent directors' connections to fraud firms significantly increase a firm's propensity to fraud commission and the likelihood of fraud detection is also higher. Overall, our results suggest that directors' personal networks have a “dark side”. Regulators should be aware of unintended consequences associated with directors' external social connections when considering how to prevent and detect corporate fraud.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.05.014
- Volume
- 45
- Pages
- 401-427
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib