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Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 18 No. 3 2012

Internal governance, legal institutions and bank loan contracting around the world

Wenxia Ge1; Jeong‐Bon Kim2; Byron Y. Song3

1 University of Manitoba · 2 City University of Hong Kong · 3 Concordia University

Abstract

Using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 22 countries during 2003–2007, we examine the effect of firm-level governance on various features of loan contracting in the international loan market. We find that banks charge lower loan rates, offer larger and longer-maturity loans, and impose fewer restrictive covenants to better-governed firms. We also find that the favorable effect of firm-level governance on some loan contracting terms is stronger in countries with strong legal institutions than in countries with weak legal institutions. Our results suggest that banks view a borrower's internal governance as a factor that mitigates agency and information risk, and that country-level legal institutions and firm-level governance mechanisms complement each other in influencing loan contracting terms.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.006
Volume
18
Issue
3
Pages
413-432
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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