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Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 34 2015

Exchange trading rules, surveillance and suspected insider trading

Michael Aitken1; Douglas J. Cumming2,3; Feng Zhan4,5

1 Macquarie University · 2 York University · 3 Florida Atlantic University · 4 Western University · 5 John Carroll University

Abstract

We examine the impact of stock exchange trading rules and surveillance on the frequency and severity of suspected insider trading cases in 22 stock exchanges around the world over the period January 2003 through June 2011. Using new indices for market manipulation, insider trading, and broker–agency conflict based on the specific provisions of the trading rules of each stock exchange, along with surveillance to detect non-compliance with such rules, we show that more detailed exchange trading rules and surveillance over time and across markets significantly reduce the number of suspected cases, but increase the profits per suspected case.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.07.013
Volume
34
Pages
311-330
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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