Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 33 2015
CEOs in family firms: Does junior know what he's doing?
Abstract
We model the evolution of CEO quality in family firms. When heirs work toward a common goal alongside an older generation, Bayesian updating attributes success mostly to the older (proven) agent. Thus, heirs learn little about their own skill. This effect is strongest after the founder, implying that family firms tend to either die immediately or be relatively long-lived. More generally, we obtain an even/odd fluctuation in generational quality. Because uncertainty breeds caution, our analysis points to a conservative managerial style in family firms and emphasizes the importance of external screening mechanisms, especially for heirs following a very successful generation.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.01.010
- Volume
- 33
- Pages
- 345-361
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex