← Search

Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 60 2020

Post-acquisition performance of private acquirers

Andrey Golubov1; Nan Xiong2

1 University of Toronto · 2 University of Surrey

open access

Abstract

We provide the first evidence on the performance of private operating firms as acquirers. Private bidders experience greater post-acquisition operating performance improvements compared to public bidders. This effect is not due to differences in target types, merger accounting, financing constraints, private equity ownership or subsequent listing of some private bidders, and is robust to instrumentation. Further analysis of governance arrangements at least partially attributes the private bidder effect to lower agency costs in private firms. Not only do private firms pay lower prices for target firm assets, they also operate them more efficiently by containing overhead costs and capital expenditures.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101545
Volume
60
Pages
101545
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite