Political Control, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Case of China

Sujuan Xie; Bingxuan Lin; Jingjing Li

doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2022.102161

Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 72 2022

Political Control, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Case of China

Sujuan Xie¹; Bingxuan Lin²; Jingjing Li ^3,4

¹ Ocean University of China · ² University of Rhode Island · ³ Harbin Institute of Technology · ⁴ University Town of Shenzhen

open access

Abstract

We examine whether requiring a Party committee to lead corporate governance at listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) affects firm value in China. We find that the market reacts positively to the inclusion of Party leadership in SOEs' governance structure and that the prospect of a crackdown on SOE corruption is likely to be the reason. The China governance model is strikingly different from other known models, and our findings suggest that a convergence of the corporate governance system of different countries due to globalization might not be the only outcome.

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2022.102161
Volume: 72
Pages: 102161
Language: en
Sources: bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Political Control, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Case of China

Abstract

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