Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 32 2015
Executive compensation in family firms: The effect of multiple family members
Abstract
We explore the conflicts between the controlling founder of a firm and her family members by studying how their ownership affects executive compensation differently. Using a sample of family firms in China, we find that the ownership of a controlling family owner is negatively correlated with the level of executive compensation and has a positive effect on pay-for-performance sensitivity. However, the ownership of other family members is positively associated with executive compensation and has a negative effect on pay-for-performance sensitivity. We find that when the quality of corporate governance is low and when other family members hold excess control rights in the firm, the unfavorable effect of other family members is more striking.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.014
- Volume
- 32
- Pages
- 238-257
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref