Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 78 2023
Callable or convertible debt? The role of debt overhang and covenants
open access
Abstract
We analyze what role debt overhang and covenants have in a manager’s choice between issuing callable or convertible debt when a firm needs to issue a substantial amount of debt. Callable bonds provide a higher coupon in exchange for a repurchase option. Convertible bonds offer bondholders the option to exchange debt to equity. Using a dynamic capital structure model with investment choice, we find that callable debt implies a larger debt overhang friction, and for highly leveraged firms convertible debt is preferred. Moreover, if outstanding bonds have net-worth covenants attached, callable bonds are more likely to be issued. Our empirical findings support the theory.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2022.102346
- Volume
- 78
- Pages
- 102346
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref