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Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 1 No. 1 1994

Corporate voting: Evidence from charter amendment proposals

James A. Brickley1; Ronald C. Lease2; Clifford W. Smith1

1 University of Rochester · 2 University of Utah

Abstract

Some argue that managers effectively control corporate voting: hence the process is meaningless. Others contend that shareholder voting motivates managers to maximize firm value. We provide evidence on this debate by analyzing the results from a large sample of management-sponsored anti-takeover amendments. Our results do not support the extreme form of either hypothesis. The evidence suggests that shareholder voting is important and indicates the circumstances where voting is most likely to constrain managers. Our results also have implications for the use of voting in political and other non-corporate contexts.

DOI
10.1016/0929-1199(94)90008-6
Volume
1
Issue
1
Pages
5-31
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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