← Search

Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 12 No. 1 2005

What motivates managers?

Aswath Damodaran; Kose John; Crocker H. Liu

New York University

Abstract

We formulate and test several hypotheses on managerial motivation using organizational form changes in the real estate industry. We find that firms that switch to a more restrictive structure have increases in stock value and managerial ownership. Firms moving to a less restrictive structure have larger wealth effects when higher monitoring exists. Higher degree of financial distress and forced CEO replacement at the time of organizational form change are taken to be proxies for higher degree of (creditor) monitoring. The wealth effects are decreasing in the firm's level of free cash flow at the time of organizational form change.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2004.03.001
Volume
12
Issue
1
Pages
1-26
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite