← Search

Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 62 2020

Antitakeover Provisions and Firm Value: New Evidence from the M&A Market

Wolfgang Drobetz1; Paul P. Momtaz2

1 Universität Hamburg · 2 UCLA Anderson, 110 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA

open access

Abstract

New evidence from acquisition decisions suggests that antitakeover provisions (ATPs) may increase firm value when internal corporate governance is sufficiently strong. We document that, in Germany, firms with stronger ATPs, and particularly supermajority provisions, are better acquirers. Managers of high-ATP firms create value in acquisitions by making governance-improving deals. They are more likely to engage in acquisitions that reduce their own entrenchment level and less likely to invest in declining industries. The empirical evidence is consistent with a short-termist interpretation. Takeover threats can induce myopic investment decisions, which ATPs can mitigate. They lead managers to engage more often in value-creating long-term and innovative investing, and increase a firm's sensitivity to investment opportunities. Our findings contribute to a growing literature challenging conventional wisdom that the agency-increasing effect of ATPs empirically dominates the myopia-eliminating effect, suggesting that a more contextual view of the value implications of ATPs is necessary.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101594
Volume
62
Pages
101594
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

Cite