← Search

Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 9 No. 1 2003

Decentralization of the firm: theory and evidence

Andrew A. Christie1; Marc P Joye2; Ross L. Watts3

1 Louisiana State University · 2 Union Bank of Switzerland · 3 University of Rochester

Abstract

Value maximization requires either that knowledge is transferred to those with the right to make decisions, or that decision rights are transferred to those who have the knowledge. A tradeoff of knowledge transfer costs and control costs is required. Characteristics of firms' investment opportunity sets (IOSs) that affect knowledge transfer costs and control costs are identified. Testable predictions about the relations between these characteristics and firms' decentralization decisions are developed and tested. The evidence presented is consistent with our predictions and is robust to different ways of measuring variables.

DOI
10.1016/s0929-1199(01)00036-0
Volume
9
Issue
1
Pages
3-36
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite