Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 70 2021
Conflict of interest and proxy voting by institutional investors
Abstract
Political pressures can bias public pension funds (PPFs) toward activist shareholders. The pension business ties mutual fund families (MFFs) have with portfolio firms can bias them toward firm management. We examine how these contrasting conflicts of interest affect institutional investors' proxy voting behavior and show PPFs (MFFs) are considerably more supportive of activist shareholders (firm management) in voting, even if doing so may harm investment value. The biases are more pronounced when incentive conflicts are stronger. PPFs support shareholder (management) proposals more (less) when Democrats gain more power in the fund's home state. Conflicted PPFs are particularly active in supporting value reducing shareholder proposals.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102089
- Volume
- 70
- Pages
- 102089
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref