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Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 49 2018

Private benefits of control and bank loan contracts

Chih-Yung Lin1; Wei-Che Tsai2; Iftekhar Hasan3,4,5; Le Quoc Tuan6,7

1 Yuan Ze University · 2 National Sun Yat-sen University · 3 The University of Sydney · 4 Fordham University · 5 Bank of Finland · 6 The State Bank of Vietnam · 7 Banking Academy of Vietnam

Abstract

This paper investigates whether or not private benefits of control by managers and large shareholders influence the financing cost of firms. Evidence shows that lending banks demand a significantly higher loan spread, higher fees, shorter loan maturity, smaller loan size, stricter covenants, and greater collateral on firms with greater private benefits of control. Results are stronger for firms with weak corporate governance quality, supporting the agency cost viewpoint. Such evidence implies that banks consider higher private benefits of control as a type of agency problem when they make lending decisions.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.01.006
Volume
49
Pages
324-343
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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