Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 16 No. 1 2010
Have changing takeover defense rules and strategies entrenched management and damaged shareholders? The case of defeated takeover bids
Abstract
Using the Delaware Supreme Court's Time-Warner decision of July 1989 as a focal point, we study defeated takeover bids before and after July 1989 to assess the direct effects of stronger takeover impediments on takeover defense tactics used to defeat bids and the resulting shareholder wealth outcomes and managerial turnover. We find that firms that defeated takeover bids after July 1989 shifted away from the use of active takeover defenses (repurchases, special dividends, greenmail, and leverage increases). Nevertheless, shareholders of firms that defeat a takeover experienced slightly better wealth outcomes in the 1990s than in the 1980s. We also find increased managerial turnover rates after defeating a takeover bid post Time-Warner, suggesting that managers that defeat hostile takeover bids did not become more entrenched due to greater takeover impediments relative to prior years.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.09.002
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 16-37
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref