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Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 67 2021

The Economics of Law Enforcement: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Corporate Takeover Law

Gishan Dissanaike1; Wolfgang Drobetz2; Paul P. Momtaz3,4; Jörg Rocholl5

1 University of Cambridge · 2 Universität Hamburg · 3 Goethe University Frankfurt · 4 University of California, Los Angeles · 5 European School of Management and Technology

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of takeover law enforcement on corporate acquisitions. We use the European Takeover Directive as a natural experiment, which harmonizes takeover law across countries, while leaving its enforcement to the discretion of individual countries. We exploit this heterogeneity in enforcement quality across countries in a difference-in-differences-in-differences model, while employing an overall inductive research approach, following Karpoff and Whittry's (2018) recommendation. We find that acquirer returns increase in countries with improvements in takeover law, driven by better target selection and lower cost of financing. The increase in acquirer returns is lower in weak enforcement jurisdictions, which we identify by developing a novel Takeover Law Enforcement Index (TLEI). The findings show that takeover law can mitigate agency conflicts, but its true value depends on its enforcement. Our results are strongly robust to alternative model specifications.

DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101849
Volume
67
Pages
101849
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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