Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 10 No. 1 2004
The “CalPERS effect” revisited
Abstract
Institutional investors have become more active in corporate governance with the relaxation of Depression Era securities laws. The California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) is a leading institutional activist. In this paper, we examine the relationship between CalPERS' public targeting and both short- and long-term stock returns to address what has been dubbed the “CalPERS effect.” Our results indicate evidence of an announcement effect and that, while there is also evidence of some long-term improvement, it is limited to 6 months from the announcement of the target list in the Wall Street Journal when more consistent empirical methodologies are employed.
- DOI
- 10.1016/s0929-1199(03)00020-8
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 157-174
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref