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Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 62 No. 2 2024

The Political Economics of Non-democracy

Georgy Egorov1; Konstantin Sonin2

1 Northwestern University · 2 University of Chicago

Abstract

We survey recent theoretical and empirical literature on political economics of non-democracies. Nondemocratic regimes face multiple challenges to their rule, both internal, such as palace coups or breakdown of their support coalition, and external, such as mass protests or revolutions. We analyze strategic decisions made by dictators from the standpoint of maximizing the chances of regime survival in the light of these challenges, and show how it explains multiple common patterns, from hiring political loyalists to positions that require competence, to restricting media freedom at the cost of sacrificing bureaucratic efficiency, to running propaganda campaigns, organizing election fraud, purging opponents and associates, and repressing citizens.

DOI
10.1257/jel.20221494
Volume
62
Issue
2
Pages
594-636
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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