Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 132 No. 3 2019
How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions
Abstract
We provide new evidence on the value of independent directors by exploiting exogenous events that seriously distract independent directors. Approximately 20% of independent directors are significantly distracted in a typical year. They attend fewer meetings, trade less frequently in the firm's stock, and resign from the board more frequently, indicating declining firm-specific knowledge and a reduced board commitment. Firms with more preoccupied independent directors have declining firm valuation and operating performance and exhibit weaker merger and acquisition (M&A) profitability and accounting quality. These effects are stronger when distracted independent directors play key board monitoring roles and when firms require greater director attention.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.014
- Volume
- 132
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 226-256
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib