Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 85 No. 1 2007
Executive stock options and IPO underpricing
Abstract
In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.006
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 39-65
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib