Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 72 No. 3 2004
U.S. cross-listings and the private benefits of control: evidence from dual-class firms
Abstract
Non-U.S. firms that cross-list on U.S. exchanges have voting premiums that are 43% lower than non-U.S. firms that do not cross-list. The difference in voting premiums is statistically significant after controlling for firm and country characteristics and the difference is larger for firms from countries that provide poor protection to minority investors. When a U.S. listing is announced, both the high- and low-voting share classes benefit, although the low-voting class benefits relatively more. The evidence supports the bonding hypothesis: cross-listing in the U.S. improves the protection afforded to minority investors and decreases the private benefits of control.
- DOI
- 10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00208-3
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 519-553
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib