Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 174 2025
Dealer balance sheets and bidding behavior in the Bank of England’s QE reverse auctions
Abstract
We study dealers’ bidding behavior in the Bank of England’s quantitative easing (QE) reverse auctions. Using a granular dataset on both accepted and rejected offers together with an equilibrium model of bidding behavior, we estimate dealers’ valuations of securities offered to the Bank of England. We also recover the rents accruing to dealers from participating in the auctions as opposed to liquidating gilts in the secondary market, thereby possibly causing prices to change. These rents or so-called ”liquidity benefits” are largest in the early phases of QE implemented during the Global Financial Crisis, suggesting that QE may be particularly effective in restoring smooth market functioning when market participants are facing large liquidity shocks. Finally, we document that dealers’ valuations vary significantly with the amount of interest rate risk acquired in the secondary gilt market before the auction and with dealers’ regulatory capital.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104182
- Volume
- 174
- Pages
- 104182
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref