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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 139 No. 2 2021

Bank monitoring: Evidence from syndicated loans

Matthew Gustafson1; Ivan Ivanov2,3; Ralf R. Meisenzahl4

1 Pennsylvania State University · 2 Federal Reserve · 3 Federal Reserve Board of Governors · 4 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Abstract

We directly measure banks’ monitoring of syndicated loans. Banks typically demand borrower information on at least a monthly basis. About 20% of loans involve active monitoring (i.e., site visits or third-party appraisals). Monitoring increases with the lead bank’s incentives and the value of information and is negatively associated with loan spreads and maturity. The monitoring captured by our measures can either complement or substitute for covenant-based monitoring, depending on whether the monitoring informs covenant compliance. Banks increase monitoring following deteriorations in borrower financial condition and credit line drawdowns. Finally, monitoring is positively related to future covenant violations and loan renegotiations.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.08.017
Volume
139
Issue
2
Pages
452-477
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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