Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 13 No. 1 1984
Investment incentives, debt, and warrants
Abstract
This paper models and characterizes investment incentive problems associated with debt financing. The decision problem of residual claimants is explicity formulated and their investment policies are characterized. The paper also analyzes the use of conversion features and warrants to control distortionary incentives. These claims reverse the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm's earnings, and this mitigates the incentive to take risk. It is shown that, under certain conditions, such claims can be constructed to restore net present value maximizing incentives and simultaneously meet the financing requirements of the firm.
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405x(84)90034-5
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 115-136
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref