Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 80 No. 3 2006

CEO incentives and earnings management

Daniel Bergstresser¹; Thomas Philippon^2,3

¹ Brandeis University · ² New York University · ³ National Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract

Abtract We provide evidence that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced at firms where the CEO's potential total compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. In addition, during years of high accruals, CEOs exercise unusually large numbers of options and CEOs and other insiders sell large quantities of shares.

DOI

10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.011

Volume

80

Issue

3

Pages

511-529

Language

en

Sources

crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex

Cite

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