Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 132 No. 2 2019
Entry and competition in takeover auctions
open access
Abstract
We estimate the degree of uncertainty faced by potential bidders in takeover auctions and quantify how it affects prices in auctions and negotiations. The high degree of uncertainty revealed by our structural estimation encourages entry in auctions but reduces a target’s bargaining power in negotiations. In the aggregate, auctions and negotiations produce similar prices, even though auctions are preferred in takeover markets with high uncertainty, while the reverse is true for negotiations. Firm characteristics predict pre-entry uncertainty and thus are informative about the relative performance of auctions and negotiations for individual targets.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.10.007
- Volume
- 132
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 298-324
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref