Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 111 No. 3 2014
Motivating innovation in newly public firms
Abstract
Prior research suggests that executive option grants that do not quickly vest provide managers with better incentives to pursue long-term, instead of short-term, objectives. Previous research also suggests that the pursuit of long-term objectives could be undermined by the risk of early termination. We conjecture that these arguments jointly suggest that managers are better motivated to pursue innovation when they are given more incentive compensation with longer vesting periods for unexercised options and yet some protection from disruptive takeover threats. Our evidence for a sample of newly public firms is consistent with more innovative firms jointly choosing such a combination.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.11.010
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 578-588
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref