Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 24 No. 1 1989
Managerial performance, Tobin's Q, and the gains from successful tender offers
Abstract
For a sample of successful tender offers, we find that the shareholders of high q bidders gain significantly more than the shareholders of low q bidders. In general, the shareholders of low q targets benefit more from takeovers than the shareholders of high q targets. Typical bidders have persistently low q ratios prior to the acquisition announcement while target q ratios decline significantly over the five years before the tender offer. Our results are consistent with the view that takeovers of poorly managed targets by well-managed bidders have higher bidder, target, and total gains.
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405x(89)90075-5
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 137-154
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref