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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 24 No. 1 1989

Managerial performance, Tobin's Q, and the gains from successful tender offers

Larry H. P. Lang1,2,3; RenéM. Stulz2,3,4; Ralph A. Walkling5,2,3

1 Chinese University of Hong Kong · 2 The Ohio State University · 3 New York University · 4 Drexel University · 5 National Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract

For a sample of successful tender offers, we find that the shareholders of high q bidders gain significantly more than the shareholders of low q bidders. In general, the shareholders of low q targets benefit more from takeovers than the shareholders of high q targets. Typical bidders have persistently low q ratios prior to the acquisition announcement while target q ratios decline significantly over the five years before the tender offer. Our results are consistent with the view that takeovers of poorly managed targets by well-managed bidders have higher bidder, target, and total gains.

DOI
10.1016/0304-405x(89)90075-5
Volume
24
Issue
1
Pages
137-154
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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