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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 14 No. 1 1985

Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders

Lawrence R. Glosten1,2; Paul Milgrom3

1 Northwestern University · 2 University of Chicago · 3 Yale University

Abstract

The presence of traders with superior information leads to a positive bid-ask spread even when the specialist is risk-neutral and makes zero expected profits. The resulting transaction prices convey information, and the expectation of the average spread squared times volume is bounded by a number that is independent of insider activity. The serial correlation of transaction price differences is a function of the proportion of the spread due to adverse selection. A bid-ask spread implies a divergence between observed returns and realizable returns. Observed returns are approximately realizable returns plus what the uninformed anticipate losing to the insiders.

DOI
10.1016/0304-405x(85)90044-3
Volume
14
Issue
1
Pages
71-100
Language
en
Sources
crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex

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