Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 67 No. 2 2003
Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia
Abstract
The onset of the Asian financial crisis in Malaysia reduced the expected value of government subsidies to politically connected firms, accounting for roughly 9% of the estimated 60 billion loss in their market value from July 1997 to August 1998. Firing the Deputy Prime Minister and imposing capital controls in September 1998 primarily benefited firms with strong ties to Prime Minister Mahathir, accounting for roughly 32% of these firms’ estimated 5 billion gain in market value during September 1998. The evidence suggests Malaysian capital controls provided a screen behind which favored firms could be supported.
- DOI
- 10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00255-6
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 351-382
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref