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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 116 No. 1 2015

The role of dynamic renegotiation and asymmetric information in financial contracting

Michael R. Roberts1,2

1 University of Pennsylvania · 2 National Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract

Using data from Securities and Exchange Commission filings, I show that the typical bank loan is renegotiated five times, or every nine months. The pricing, maturity, amount, and covenants are all significantly modified during each renegotiation, whose timing is governed by the financial health of the contracting parties and uncertainty regarding the borrowers’ credit quality. The relative importance of these factors depends on the duration of the lending relationship. I interpret these results in light of financial contracting theories and emphasize that renegotiation is an important mechanism for dynamically completing contracts and for allocating control rights ex post.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.11.013
Volume
116
Issue
1
Pages
61-81
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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