Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 43 No. 2 1997
Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?
Abstract
We examine the role of the target firm's independent outside directors during takeover attempts by tender offer. We find that when the target's board is independent, the initial tender offer premium, the bid premium revision, and the target shareholder gains over the entire tender offer period are higher, and that the presence of a poison pill and takeover resistance lead to greater premiums and shareholder gains. We conclude that independent outside directors enhance target shareholder gains from tender offers, and that boards with a majority of independent directors are more likely to use resistance strategies to enhance shareholder wealth.
- DOI
- 10.1016/s0304-405x(96)00886-0
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 195-218
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref