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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 142 No. 2 2021

Dynastic control without ownership: Evidence from post-war Japan

Morten Bennedsen1,2; Vikas Mehrotra3; Jungwook Shim4; Yupana Wiwattanakantang5

1 University of Copenhagen · 2 INSEAD · 3 University of Alberta · 4 Kyoto Sangyo University · 5 National University of Singapore

Abstract

Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding-family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than 5%). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki, and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes family ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of family legacy and talent.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.018
Volume
142
Issue
2
Pages
831-843
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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