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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 66 No. 2-3 2002

Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially constrained arbitrageurs

Denis Gromb1,2; Dimitri Vayanos3

1 Centre for Economic Policy Research · 2 London Business School · 3 National Bureau of Economic Research

open access

Abstract

We propose a multiperiod model in which competitive arbitrageurs exploit discrepancies between the prices of two identical risky assets traded in segmented markets. Arbitrageurs need to collateralize separately their positions in each asset, and this implies a financial constraint limiting positions as a function of wealth. In our model, arbitrage activity benefits all investors because arbitrageurs supply liquidity to the market. However, arbitrageurs might fail to take a socially optimal level of risk, in the sense that a change in their positions can make all investors better off. We characterize conditions under which arbitrageurs take too much or too little risk.

DOI
10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00228-3
Volume
66
Issue
2-3
Pages
361-407
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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