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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 88 No. 2 2008

Financial expertise of directors

A. Burak Güner; Ulrike Malmendier1; Geoffrey A. Tate2

1 University of California, Berkeley · 2 University of California, Los Angeles

Abstract

We analyze how directors with financial expertise affect corporate decisions. Using a novel panel data set, we find that financial experts exert significant influence, though not necessarily in the interest of shareholders. When commercial bankers join boards, external funding increases and investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases. However, the increased financing flows to firms with good credit but poor investment opportunities. Similarly, investment bankers on boards are associated with larger bond issues but worse acquisitions. We find little evidence that financial experts affect compensation policy. The results suggest that increasing financial expertise on boards may not benefit shareholders if conflicting interests (e.g., bank profits) are neglected.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.05.009
Volume
88
Issue
2
Pages
323-354
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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