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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 114 No. 2 2014

CEO optimism and incentive compensation

Clemens A. Otto

HEC Paris

Abstract

I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than their peers. These findings add to our understanding of the interplay between managerial biases and remuneration and show how sophisticated principals can take advantage of optimistic agents by appropriately adjusting their compensation contracts.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.06.006
Volume
114
Issue
2
Pages
366-404
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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