Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 79 No. 2 2006
Competition among regulators and credit market integration☆
Abstract
We analyze the incentives for independent bank regulators with financially integrated jurisdictions to form a regulatory union. Externalities lead competing regulators to choose suboptimally low standards. Centralized regulation, however, entails a loss of flexibility if equal standards must be applied across jurisdictions. We find that, first, centralized regulation will more likely emerge among relatively homogeneous jurisdictions/countries. Second, centralized regulation will be unanimously preferred to independence only if it entails standards higher than those of the country with the highest individual standards. Third, financial integration among more than two jurisdictions may prevent partial unions, which, in turn, may prevent more comprehensive agreements.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.02.003
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 401-430
- Language
- en
- Sources
- crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex