Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 76 No. 3 2005
Conflicts between principals and agents: evidence from residential brokerage
Abstract
When a homeowner uses an agent to sell his property, he may have less information than his agent and be disadvantaged in price setting and negotiating. This study examines whether the percentage commission structure in real estate brokerage creates agency problems. We investigate whether agents are able to use their information advantage to either sell their own property faster or for a higher price than their clients’ properties. The empirical results confirm our theoretical predictions of agency problems, as we find that agent-owned houses sell no faster than client-owned houses, but they do sell at a price premium of approximately 4.5%.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.006
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 627-665
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref