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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 145 No. 2 2022

To pool or not to pool? Security design in OTC markets

Vincent Glode1; Christian C. Opp2,3; Ruslan Sverchkov4

1 University of Pennsylvania · 2 National Bureau of Economic Research · 3 University of Rochester · 4 University of Warwick

Abstract

We study security issuers’ decisions on whether to pool assets when facing counterparties endowed with market power, as is common in over-the-counter markets. Our analysis reveals how buyers’ market power may render the pooling of assets suboptimal — both privately and socially — in particular, when the potential gains from trade are large. Pooling assets then reduces the elasticity of trade volume in the relevant part of the payoff distribution, exacerbating the inefficient rationing associated with the exercise of buyers’ market power. Our analysis provides insight on the determinants of asset-backed securities issuance, including regulatory reforms affecting financial institutions’ liquidity.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.09.021
Volume
145
Issue
2
Pages
508-526
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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