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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 147 No. 2 2023

Refusing the best price?

Sida Li1; Mao Ye2; Miles Zheng3

1 Brandeis University · 2 Cornell University · 3 University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Abstract

The Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) links fragmented stock exchanges by routing orders to the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO). As the NBBO ignores exchange fees, 62% of routings lead to worse net prices. An increase in fee differences increases the market share captured by orders that refuse Reg NMS routings, particularly for stocks whose fees account for a large portion of transaction costs. Heterogeneous opportunity costs rationalize routing choices: non-routable orders entail lower non-execution costs than routable orders. Our results indicate that fees and clientele segmentation drive the proliferation of order types in the Reg NMS era.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.11.004
Volume
147
Issue
2
Pages
317-337
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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