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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 61 No. 3 2001

Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard

Antonio E. Bernardo1; Hongbin Cai1; Jiang Luo2

1 University of California, Los Angeles · 2 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Abstract

We consider optimal capital allocation and managerial compensation mechanisms for decentralized firms when division managers have an incentive to misrepresent project quality and to minimize privately costly but value-enhancing effort. We show that in the optimal mechanism firms always underinvest in capital relative to a naive application of the net present value (NPV) rule. We make a number of novel cross-sectional predictions about the severity of the underinvestment problem and the composition of managerial compensation contracts. We also find that firms will optimally give greater performance-based pay (at the expense of fixed wages) to managers of higher quality projects to mitigate the incentive for managers to overstate project quality. Managers may thus receive greater performance-based pay because they manage higher quality projects, not that greater performance-based pay causes firm value to increase.

DOI
10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00065-4
Volume
61
Issue
3
Pages
311-344
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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