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Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 11 No. 1-4 1983

The wealth effects of targeted share repurchases

Michael Bradley1,2; L. Macdonald Wakeman1,2

1 University of California, Los Angeles · 2 University of Michigan–Ann Arbor

open access

Abstract

This paper examines the wealth impact of share repurchases that restrict participation to a particular sub-set of a firm's stockholders. Repurchases at a premium from insiders and small shareholders increase the wealth of non-participating stockholders and are therefore consistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis. However, privately negotiated repurchases of single blocks from stockholders unaffiliated with the firm reduce the wealth of non-participating stockholders. In contrast to the evidence for general repurchases, no positive wealth effect offsets the significant repurchase premium paid to the selling stockholder. Indeed, the wealth loss to non-participating stockholders is significantly greater than the premium paid. This evidence is inconsistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis and supports the hypothesis that managers in their self-interest use single block repurchases to eliminate threats to their control over the firm's resources.

DOI
10.1016/0304-405x(83)90015-6
Volume
11
Issue
1-4
Pages
301-328
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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