Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 11 No. 1-4 1983
The wealth effects of targeted share repurchases
Abstract
This paper examines the wealth impact of share repurchases that restrict participation to a particular sub-set of a firm's stockholders. Repurchases at a premium from insiders and small shareholders increase the wealth of non-participating stockholders and are therefore consistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis. However, privately negotiated repurchases of single blocks from stockholders unaffiliated with the firm reduce the wealth of non-participating stockholders. In contrast to the evidence for general repurchases, no positive wealth effect offsets the significant repurchase premium paid to the selling stockholder. Indeed, the wealth loss to non-participating stockholders is significantly greater than the premium paid. This evidence is inconsistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis and supports the hypothesis that managers in their self-interest use single block repurchases to eliminate threats to their control over the firm's resources.
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405x(83)90015-6
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1-4
- Pages
- 301-328
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref