← Search

Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 35 No. 2 1994

The costs of inefficient bargaining and financial distress

Sanjai Bhagat1; James A. Brickley2; Jeffrey L. Coles3

1 University of Colorado Boulder · 2 University of Rochester · 3 University of Utah

Abstract

This study provides the first large-sample analysis of the stock-market reactions to interfirm litigation. When a suit is filed, the common stock of the typical defendant declines by about 1%, while the plaintiff experiences no significant gains. For the average pair of firms, the combined drop in value upon filing is $21 million. Much of the loss is regained if the suit is settled. The findings suggest that bargaining among firm claimants sometimes leads to very inefficient outcomes. Part of the leakage is explained by the costs of increased financial distress imposed on the defendant.

DOI
10.1016/0304-405x(94)90005-1
Volume
35
Issue
2
Pages
221-247
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite