← Search

Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 126 No. 1 2017

Do managers overreact to salient risks? Evidence from hurricane strikes

Olivier Dessaint1; Adrien Matray2

1 University of Toronto · 2 Princeton University

Abstract

We study how managers respond to hurricane events when their firms are located in the neighborhood of the disaster area. We find that the sudden shock to the perceived liquidity risk leads managers to increase corporate cash holdings and to express more concerns about hurricane risk in 10-Ks/10-Qs, even though the actual risk remains unchanged. Both effects are temporary. Over time, the perceived risk decreases, and the bias disappears. The distortion between perceived and actual risk is large, and the increase in cash is suboptimal. Overall, managerial reaction to hurricanes is consistent with salience theories of choice.

DOI
10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.07.002
Volume
126
Issue
1
Pages
97-121
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite