Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 35 No. 1 1994
Markups, quantity risk, and bidding strategies at treasury coupon auctions
Abstract
This study uses intraday when-issued rate quotes to examine the rewards and risks of the Treasury coupon auctions for bidders who face different tradeoffs between the winner's curse and quantity risk. The data indicate that markups of auction average rates over bid when-issued rates at auction times average 3/8 basis point. I also find that when-issued rates react as strongly to bidding aggressiveness at auctions before the auction results are announced as theydo afterward, and that quantity risk is as important as the winner's curse.
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405x(94)90017-5
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 43-62
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref