Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 20 1988
The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth
Abstract
This paper examines empirical evidence about the effect of poison pill takeover defenses on shareholder wealth. I find evidence that announcements of the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with stock price declines. Also, the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with abnormally high rates of defeat of unsolicited tender offers. Although this evidence is consistent with managerial entrenchment, the evidence implies that, on average, poison pill defenses have seemingly had only a modest effect on firm valuation.
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405x(88)90051-7
- Volume
- 20
- Pages
- 377-417
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref