Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 153 2024
Harnessing the overconfidence of the crowd: A theory of SPACs
Abstract
In a SPAC transaction, a sponsor raises financing from investors using redeemable shares and rights. When investors are sophisticated, these features dilute the sponsor's stake and can lead to underinvestment in profitable targets. However, when investors are overconfident about their ability to respond to interim news, the optionality in such features is overpriced, and SPACs can lead to over-investment in unprofitable targets. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts different returns for short-term and long-term investors and overall underperformance. While some policy interventions (e.g., eliminating redemption rights, limiting investor access, and restricting warrants) improve returns for unsophisticated investors, others (e.g., increased disclosure) can be counterproductive.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103787
- Volume
- 153
- Pages
- 103787
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref